This note shows that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined in Uno (2007, Economics Bulletin 3 (17)) if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.
Introduction
Whenever we analyze a strategic situation as a game, we face the issue of the existence of a Nash equilibrium, especially a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for economic applications. In the literature, several sucient conditions for existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium have been provided. ! Among such conditions, those in terms of "strategic complementarities" by Topkis (1973) and Vives (1990) and those in terms of "potential functions" by Rosenthal (1973) and Monderer and Shapley (1996) , can be applied even if action sets are nite.
" This note investigates the relationship between these two conditions.
A game of strategic complementarities is a game in which if the competitors turn more aggressive, the agent's optimal reaction is to become more aggressive as well. Many economic models belong to this class of games.
# The weakest version of such strategic complementarities is the weak strategic complementarities discussed in Dubey et al. (2006) .
Games of weak strategic complementarities are those in which, for each player i, there exists a selection within i's best response correspondence which is non-decreasing in the other players' action.
On the other hand, several versions of potential functions also have been proposed since Monderer and Shapley (1996) . $ These potential functions have a common feature: a potential function is a real-valued function over the set of action proles of a game, and every maximizer of a potential function is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the games. That is, in games with a potential function, known as a potential game, the problem of nding a Nash equilibrium is a simple maximization problem rather than a xed point problem. This implies that every potential game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if action sets are nite. The weakest version of such potential functions is the nested pseudo-potential function introduced in Uno (2007a) . ! For example, see Debreu (1952) , Glicksberg (1952) , Nikaido and Isoda (1955) , Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , Topkis (1979) , Vives (1990) , Rosenthal (1973) , Monderer and Shapley (1996) , Milchtaich (1996) and so on. " In fact, Topkis (1973) used the term of supermodular instead of strategic complementarities. Strategic complementarities were originally used by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) . Rosenthal (1973) did not use the term of potential function, but essentially used the same concept as exact potential function dened by Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Milchtaich (1996) provided a sucient condition in congestion games with player specic utilities, where action sets are nite.
# See Topkis (1998), Vives (1999) , and Amir (2005 Uno (2007b) and so on.
The nested pseudo-potential functions generalize the pseudo-potential functions dened by Dubey et al. (2006) . A pseudo-potential function of a game is a real-valued function f over its set of action proles such that any best-response of each player i if endowed with f as payo function is a best-response as well in the original game. As for the other versions of potential functions, every maximizer of a pseudo-potential function of a game is a Nash equilibrium of the game. It is as if the pseudo-potential functions are payo functions of one representative agent who chooses strategies for all players.
In considering a nested pseudo-potential function, we think of a representative agent for a subset T of players instead of all of them: for each player i in T , given any strategy prole for other players, maximizing this representative agent's payo f T yields a best-response for player i. Suppose that there is a partition T of players such that, for each member T of T , there is such a representative agent whose payo function is f T .
% Then the collection of f T 's can be seen as a new complete information game, where each member T in T is regarded as a single player. That is, the original game is reduced to a game with a smaller number of players.
Notice that such reduction can be nested: the new game among step 1 representative agents may be reduced to a game with an even smaller number of players, by considering a step 2 representative agent for step 1 representative agents, and then a representative agent of these, and so on. We say that a game has a nested pseudo-potential if a game is reduced to a game with one representative agent through this process, where the payo functions of representative agents are pseudo-potential functions.
In earlier literature, Dubey et al. (2006) showed that the set of pseudo-potential games strictly includes the set of games of weak strategic complementarities if the action sets are one-dimensional and each payo function depends on her own action and the aggregator of the other players' actions, i.e., in the case of a game with an aggregator. Otherwise, a game of weak strategic complementarities may not be a pseudo-potential game, as shown in Example 6.1 below.
This note shows that the set of nested pseudo-potential games strictly includes the set of games of weak strategic complementarities if the action sets are one-dimensional, except possibly for one player, and nite (Theorem 5.1). The above relationships are illustrated in Figure 1 . This result establish that the existence of nested pseudo-potential function rather than weak strategic complementarities suces to guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium as long as we consider games where each player's action set is one-dimensional and nite. & % This idea also has appeared as q-potential in Monderer (2007) . & Unfortunately, the proof of our result depends on Taraski's xed point theorem. A set X in R m is a lattice if X contains the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of each pair of its elements, i.e., for each x, y ∈ X, inf X {x, y} ∈ X and sup X {x, y} ∈ X. Tarski (1955) showed that the collection of xed points of a non-decreasing function from a nonempty nite lattice into itself is a nonempty lattice, and he gave the form of the greatest xed point and the least xed point: ' Theorem 2.1 (Tarski, 1955) Suppose that f is a non-decreasing function from a nonempty nite lattice X to X. Then the set of xed points of f in X is a nonempty lattice, sup{x ∈ X|x ≤ f (x)} is the greatest xed point, and inf{x ∈ X|x ≥ f (x)} is the least xed point. ' In fact, Tarski (1955) provides the xed point theorem for an non-decreasing function on a complete lattice instead of a nite lattice.
Strategic Complementarities
A strategic form game consists of a nite player set N = {1, . . . , n}, an action set A i for i ∈ N , and the payo function g i : A → R for i ∈ N , where A := ∏ i∈N A i . Since we x the set A of action proles, we denote a strategic form game (N, (A i ) i∈N , (g i ) i∈N ) simply by g N := (g i ) i∈N . For notational convenience, we write a = (a i ) i∈N ∈ A; for i ∈ N , For example, the supermodular games introduced by Topkis (1979) , the games of strategic complementarities introduced by Bulow et al. (1985) , the quasi-supermodular game introduced by Milgrom and Shannon, and so on.
We can also consider a version of games with compact action sets. In the version, it is dicult to show our main result hold, as we will discuss in Remark 6.4 later. 
N is called a pseudo-potential game.
We say that an action prole a * is a pseudo-potential maximizer of g
for all a ∈ A. Dubey et al. (2006) showed that a pseudo-potential maximizer, if it exists, is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game: 
since action sets (A T ) T ∈T can be derived from the partition T of N and the set A of action
If the inclusion of (1) can be replaced by the equality, f is called an (ordinal) best-response potential, which is introduced in Voorneveld (2000) . The pseudo-potentials generalize thus the (ordinal) best-response potentials. Ui (2004, 2005 ) also introduced alternative best-response potentials, which are special classes of (ordinal) best-response potentials of Voorneveld (2000) and the pseudo-potentials in Dubey et al. (2006) . See Morris and Ui (2004) for more discussion of this notion. We can apply the analogous arguments in this section to these best-response potentials of Morris and Ui (2004 
is an increasingly coarser sequence of
is regarded as a strategic form game as above: for each
arg max
A game that admits a nested pseudo-potential is called a nested pseudo-potential game.
We say that an action prole a * is a nested pseudo-potential maximizer of g N has a partition T -potential, where q refers to the number of elements in T and the potentials in (f T ) T ∈T are meant to be the exact potentials in Monderer and Shapley (1996) . If g N is a q-potential game, then it has a partition T pseudo-potential such that the number of elements of T is q. The converse is not true, since there is a pseudo-potential game without an exact potential. Proof. See Appendix.
Secondly, in a pseudo-potential game, for each pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we can nd a pseudo-potential such that the Nash equilibrium is the unique maximizer of the pseudo-potential: be a two-person nite game with
has weak strategic complementarities, then it is a pseudo-potential game.
We extend Proposition 5.5 to the case where the action set of one player is multidimensional.
Proposition 5.6 Let g

{1,2}
be a nite two-person game with (2006) showed that games with an aggregator of weak strategic complementarities or weak strategic substitutes are pseudo-potential games.
Examples
In what follows, we show by way of examples that, when the action set of a single player is allowed multi-dimensional, the relationship among strategic complementarities, a pseudo potential and a nested pseudo potential is given as in Figure 1 of Introduction.
As mentioned in Proposition 5.5, Dubey et al. (2006) showed that two-person games of weak strategic complementarities are pseudo-potential games. However, games with more than two players of weak strategic complementarities may not be a pseudo-potential game as the following example shown. 
{1,2,3}
The following game, which appeared in Uno (2007a), strategic complementarities or a pseudo-potential game but it is a nested pseudo-potential game. Table 6 , where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the matrix; players 1 and 2 have identical interests, player 3's payo is the same as others when player 1 chooses a 1 , but is reversed otherwise as in the matching pennies game. 
is not a game of strategic complementarities. Note also that g
is not a pseudo-potential game. Indeed, g {1,2,3} has a strict best-response cycle (1, 0, 0) → N is a game of weak strategic complementarities. 
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Suppose that g {1,2} has weak strategic complementarities.
Then, for i, j = 1, 2 with i ̸ = j, there exists a function b i : 
. It then follows that there exists player 1's best-response selectionb 1 :
has strategic complementarities, there exists also player 2's best-response selectionb 2 : g 2 ) has weak strategic complementarities. By proposition 5.5, (ĝ 1 , g 2 ) has a pseudo-potentialf :
Let c ∈ R be suciently small so that c < min (â 1 ,a 2 )∈Â 1 ×A 2f (â 1 , a 2 ), which exists sincê A 1 × A 2 is nite.
Let f : A → R be a function such that, for all a 1 ∈ A 1 and all a 2 ∈ A 2 ,
We will show that f is a pseudo-potential of g {1,2} . Fix any a 2 ∈ A 2 . Pick any a * * 1 ∈ arg max a 1 ∈A 1 f (a 1 , a 2 ) . Then, a * * 1 ∈ A ′ 1 must hold by the choice of constant c in the construction of f . Since a * *
Sincef is a pseudo-potential of (ĝ 1 , g 2 ), we have h(a * * 
N is a game of weak strategic complementarities, there exists a function b {1} : 
